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COMMENT
STEPPING UP THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: COMMUNITY
POLICING AS A FOUNDATION FOR BUILDING RESILIENT
COMMUNITIES AND REFORMING THE RULE
OF LAW IN MEXICO

I.

INTRODUCTION:

A SNAPSHOT OF MASSACRE, CAPTURE, AND
COLLABORATION

On August 2010, in an abandoned farm shed in the middle of San
Fernando, Tamaulipas, Mexico, Luis Fredy Lala Pomavilla escaped
through the night in search of help.'
After walking ten miles through the arid countryside with a
gunshot wound to his neck, he stumbled across a military checkpoint
where Mexican marines were stationed.2 The wounded migrant led
the marines back to that abandoned farm shed. 3 They raided the
location and drew gunfire from the drug cartels, killing three gunmen
and losing one marine.4 After the dust cleared, the marines entered
the abandoned cinderblock farm shed and found a mass grave of
bodies with their hands tied and faces blindfolded.5 The marines
counted seventy-two bodies, all from different parts of Central and
1. See Gary Moore, Unraveling Mysteries of Mexico's San Fernando
Massacre,
INSIGHT
CRIME
(Sept.
19,
2011),
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/unravelling-mysteries-of-mexicos-sanfernando-massacre.
2. See. E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexico Migrants Massacre: Drug Cartel
Suspected in Killing of 72, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2010, 11:54 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/26/mexico-migrants-massacre_n_695299.html; Moore, supra note 1.
3. See Survivor Details Massacre of 72 Migrants by Drug Cartel in Mexico,
Fox NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/08/25/mexicangovemment-migrants-dead-ranch-killed-zetas-drug-gang/.
4. Id.
5. See Moore, supra note 1.
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South America, and all executed by members of the Zetas cartel. 6 The
massacre is one of the most horrifying examples of a mass execution
in Mexican history and a symbol of the drug violence that plagues the
nation. 7
On July 15, 2013, close to the third year anniversary of the San
Fernando massacre, a Mexican military helicopter stopped a pick-up
truck at 3:45am near the southwest border city of Nuevo Laredo.' No
gunshots were fired; no blood was shed. 9 Inside the truck was Miguel
Angel Treviflo Morales, otherwise known as "Z-40", the Zetas drug
cartel leader.' 0 The Mexican military arrested Trevifio Morales along
with two other members of the cartel; the military also seized $2
million in cash and an arsenal of weapons." Some see Trevifio's
arrest as a new era of the Mexican crime policy under the new
President Enrique Pefia Nieto; it provides an insight into Mexico's
new security policy and the role the United States will play in the next
coming years.12
6. See Castillo, supra note 2. The cartel's lieutenant, in charge of Tamaulipas
in 2010, ordered the seventy-two migrants killed because they refused to pay the
cartel money and work for them. See Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Gang Leader Held
in
Massacre
of
Migrants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/world/americas/mexican-drug-leader-salvadoralfonso-martinez-escobedo-arrested.html?_r-0.
7. See Fox NEWS, supra note 3.
8. See Catherine E. Shoichet, Mexico Captures Major Drug Lord, CNN (July
16,
2013),
http://cnn.com/2013/07/15/world/americas/mexico-zetas-leadercaptured/index.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Randal C. Archibold, Drug Kingpin Is Captured in Mexico Near Border,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/world/americas/
drug-kingpin-is-captured-in-mexico-near-border.html?_r-0.
12. Patrick Corcoran, What Z40s Arrest Tells Us about Mexico's Security
Policy, INSIGHT CRIME (July 22, 2013), http://insightcrime.org/news-analysis/whattrevinos-arrest-tells-us-about-pena-nietos-security-policy. "Trevifho's arrest provides
a boost for Mexico's security agencies ... [and] also comes as many in Mexico are
growing impatient for the promised reductions in violence." Id. Furthermore,
Treviflo was the first cartel leader arrested under the Nieto administration. Top
Mexican Drug Lords Captured or Killed, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142412788732434850457861000269684
9298. The United States also assisted the Mexican marines with tracking the leader
Trevifio and arresting him, thus showing strength in the bilateral relationship. CLARE
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The history of drug violence in Mexico is marked by battles
between the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the Mexican
government in an attempt to control the Mexican borders, whose
geographical location serves as a staple for the illicit drug trade into
the United States. 13 The importation of drugs into the United States
plays a key role in the DTOs' continual success;1 4 therefore, United
States participation is essential in the efforts to quell the drug violence
in Mexico. 1 5 The United States' and Mexico's joint efforts in dealing
with the cartel drug violence reached a pivotal collaboration in 2007
when both countries developed the Mrida Initiative.' 6 The level of
collaboration between the two countries was unprecedented; the
United States and Mexico had a unique opportunity to address the
mutual problem of the DTOs and also strengthen their bilateral
relationship. 17 Under the Mrida Initiative, former President George
RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42917, MEXICO'S PETA NIETO
ADMINISTRATION: PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES IN U.S. MEXICAN RELATIONS 7
(2013) [hereinafter PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES].
13. See generally Laura Mehalko, Note, This is Gun Country: The
InternationalImplications of U.S. Gun Control Policy, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 297, 302 (2012) (footnotes omitted) ("The growing violence in Mexico is
associated with a few 'large, sophisticated and vicious criminal organizations'
engaged in the illicit drug trade. Perhaps as a result of their growing influence, there
has been greater conflict between the DTOs over maintenance of 'zones of control'
and smuggling routes into the United States.").
14. See Callin Kerr, Comment, Mexico's Drug War: Is it Really a War?, 54 S.
TEX. L. REV. 193, 196 (2012) (footnotes omitted) ("Mexico is the number-one
source of illicit drugs in the United States . . . [O]ver 1,626 metric tons of illegal

drugs are trafficked to the United States annually, most brought through the MexicoUnited States border."). "[T]he drug cartels traffic over $ 30 billion in drugs each
year." Id. (footnote omitted) "Currently, up to 90% of all cocaine bound for the
United States goes through Mexico." Melanie Reid, Mexico's Crisis: When There's
a Will, There's a Way, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 397, 400 (2012) (footnote
omitted).
15. See infra Parts II, IV.B.
16. U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative
2008-Present:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the Comm. of
Foreign Affairs, H.R., 113th Cong. 9 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs).
17. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-837, MtRIDA INITIATIVE:
THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVIDED COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME SUPPORT
BUT NEEDS BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASURES 2 (2010) [hereinafter GAO Report].
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W. Bush and former President Felipe Calder6n focused their attention
on training and equipping the Mexican military in their anti-crime
In the development stages of the
efforts against the DTOs.18
Initiative, the United States provided equipment, technology, and
training tailored to strengthen the Mexican federal government and
meet the violence head on.19
The paradigm of the M~rida Initiative shifted in 2010 when
President Barack H. Obama and former President Calder6n agreed to
a new strategic framework focusing on the weak government
institutions and societal problems that allowed the DTOs' continual
growth in Mexico. 20 On May 2, 2013, President Obama met with
newly elected Mexican President Enrique Pefia Nieto, and both
presidents reaffirmed their collaborative commitment on security
issues arising out of the drug violence, with the goal of ultimately
improving the lives of citizens in both countries.21 Even though both
Presidents reiterated their strong commitment to continue their efforts
under the M6rida Initiative, the United States Congress placed $95
million in funds on hold and has yet to deliver between $600 and $700
million in resources to Mexico. 22 Another controversy surrounding

18. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41349, U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MtRIDA INITIATIVE
AND BEYOND 6 (2013).

19. See Steven E. Hendrix, The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central
America: The New Paradigmfor Security Cooperation,Attacking OrganizedCrime,
Corruption and Violence, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 107, 112, 114 (2008).
20. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 6.

21. Hearing, supra note 16, at 18 (testimony of John D. Feeley, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs).
President Obama stated in the May 2, 2013 meeting: "Obviously, these are serious
challenges, and President Pefia Nieto and I discussed them in depth today. I agreed
to continue our close cooperation on security, even as the nature of that cooperation
will evolve. As I told the President, it is obviously up to the Mexican people to
determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including
the United States. But the main point I made to the President is that we support the
Mexican government's focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to
continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems
appropriate." Id. at 23.
22. Id. at 31 (statements between Chairman Matt Salmon, Rep. of Ariz., and
Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs).
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the Mrida Initiative stems from the human rights violations in
Mexico that increased significantly since its implementation. 23
Mexico has yet to address and resolve these concerns; 24 thus, the
future of the Mrida Initiative remains uncertain.
This Comment supports the continued commitment of the United
States to the Mrida Initiative, which is essential in this new age of
drug violence and reformation in Mexico. Furthermore, an emphasis
in President Pefia Nieto's security plan will fall in line with the current
paradigm of the Mrida Initiative, specifically in building a stable rule
of law and resilient communities. President Pefia Nieto's plan, and
the paradigm shift of the Mrida Initiative, allows both countries to
continue their efforts uniformly and achieve their goals of the
initiative by focusing on root causes of the continual violence
stemming from the drug trade. Lastly, this Comment encourages an
introduction of community policing as a foundation to meet the
expectations of pillar II and IV of the Mrida Initiative.
Community policing tackles the severe disconnection between the
local communities, the local police, and the local government; it
creates new methods of collaboration and partnership between the
three groups, which can result in lower crime rates in the local
neighborhoods.
By building a bridge of communication and
establishing a functional relationship between the public and the
government, community policing can result in a step towards
thwarting the threat of the DTOs and creating a system for police and
government accountability.
Part II of this Comment discusses the evolution of the Mbrida
Initiative from the early stages to the current state in both the United

23. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor 2011: Mexico, U.S.
DEP'T
ST.,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011humanrightsreport/
index.htm?dlid=186528#wrapper (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) ("The most serious
human rights issues ... arose from the fight against the organized crime, which
involved frequent clashes between the security forces and Transnational Criminal
Organizations .. . ."); Country Summary: Mexico, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Jan. 2013)
[hereinafter
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH],
http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/relatedmaterial/mexico_7.pdf ("From January 2007 to mid-November
2012, Mexico's National Human Rights Commission issued detailed reports of 109
cases in which it found that members of the army had committed serious human
rights violations, and received complaints of 7,350 military abuses.").
24. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23.
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States and Mexico. It addresses the necessity for the United States to
continue its commitment to the Initiative and ensure that the proper
resources are used to reduce and eliminate the DTO violence in
Mexico. It also focuses on current Mexican President Pefia Nieto's
security strategy and how it aligns with pillar II and pillar IV of the
M6rida Initiative.
Part III discusses community policing, from its historical
foundation to current implementations.
It illustrates specific
examples, including the "Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy"
(CAPS) 25 program and Japan's community policing model, to
understand community policing in practice and how a city defines its
problems and strengthens its interactions between the police and
community.
Part IV introduces a community policing plan for Mexico through
the "Broken Windows Model." 26
It discusses the skeletal
implementation of community policing in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico, and
its success in quelling drug violence by including the community in
the rule of law. Further, it analyzes the current state of Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico, a city plagued by drug violence, and discusses the potential
ability to fundamentally change the city with the implementation of
community policing. Lastly, it addresses issues that may impede a
strong implementation of community policing, but also encourages
taking those additional steps to fundamentally improve the
relationship between the Mexican community and the government.
Part V concludes this Comment by re-emphasizing the purpose of
the M6rida Initiative, and aligning its objectives with Mexican
President Peila Nieto's security strategy in his fight to strengthen
Mexico and reduce the drug violence. It also reiterates the importance
of the United States' effort to assist Mexico as both countries continue
the fight against the DTOs. Lastly, this article encourages the
implementation of community policing as an additional component to
pillar II and pillar IV of the M6rida Initiative.

25. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO (Sept. 2000) available at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/1 79557.pdf.
26. See Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-OrientedPolicing, 39
CRIME &JUST. 1, 24 (2010).
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II. THE MRIDA INITIATIVE: COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS TO FIGHT THE
DRUG TRADE ORGANIZATIONS

The Mrida Initiative came to fruition in March 2007 when
former President Calder6n and former President Bush met in Mrida,
Yucatan, Mexico. 27 In October 2007, the United States and Mexico
proposed the initiative's plan, which would entail a "package of. ..
counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico," appropriating $1.4
billion in funding for equipment and training. 28 This plan laid the
foundation for the collaboration between the United States and
Mexico in their efforts to reduce the DTO violence in Mexico. 29 The
initial goal involved confronting the violent DTOs head on; former
President Calder6n made the DTO leaders his principal targets and
depended greatly on the military forces, naval forces, and federal
police to capture and eliminate them. 30 Former President Calder6n's

plan, however, brought negative results, and the DTOs responded
violently due to the government's actions. Since their organizations
were fractured with the loss of their leaders,31 the fracturing of the
organizations opened the door for new leaders to gain control of the
drug production and transit zones and continue to traffic drugs into the
United States.32
Furthermore, new DTOs gained momentum,
27. Hendrix, supra note 19, at 110.
28. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40135, MRIDA
INITIATIVE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES 2
(2010) [hereinafter FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES].
29. Id.
30. Hearing, supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime); FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 28. Under President
Calder6n's kingpin strategy, the government captured or killed 27 out of the 37 top
leaders. Hearing, supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime). The foundation of the Mrida Initiative was based on four
objectives: "(1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) assist
the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border, air, and
maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of the justice system in the region; and
(4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central American and diminish drug demand
in the region." FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 28, at 3.
31. Hearing, supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
32. See FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 28, at 2; See generally
Hearing,supra note 16, at 64 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director, Insight Crime)
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enlisting new tactics, weapons, and a ruthlessness that continued to
fuel the drug violence and significantly increased fatality rates in the
country.
In March 2010, the Obama Administration shifted gears and
developed a new framework for the M6rida Initiative, which focused
on four pillars: "(I) disrupt the operational capacity of organized
crime, 34 (II) institutionalize reforms to sustain rule of law and respect
for human rights, 35 (III) build a 21st century border, 36 and (IV) build
(discussing the fragmentation within the larger DTOs, their lack of central authority
within the DTOs, and steady increase in revenue).
33. See Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a NonInternationalArmed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1042, 10711072 (2011). Drug-related murders doubled from 2006 to 2007, and again in 2008
where there were approximately 6,200 killings. Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug
Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 363, 367
(2010); Bergal, supra, at 1069 n.145. Many of the killings targeted law-enforcement
agents. Wright, supra. Furthermore, clashes between the cartels change the dynamic
of the violence, specifically in the border state. See Bergal, supra at 1070. One
example was the war between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas, which were initially the
military wing of the Gulf, but broke off and began to claim their land in the
Tamaulipas area, on the Eastern border of Mexico, south of Texas. Id. at 1070-71.
34. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 12. The presence of the DTOs
remains strong due in part to the DTOs continued efforts to attain new weapons and
overall operational financing. See id. President Calder6n initiated efforts of
eliminating the DTOs with the "king-pin" strategy, which made the DTO leaders his
principal targets. Hearing, supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of Steven Dudley,
Director, Insight Crime). President Calder6n captured or killed 27 out of the 35 top
leaders, but this resulted in the development of fractions within the DTOs, thus
ensue an increase in violence to control the lucrative territories without leaders. See
id. Currently, President Nieto continues to implement the "king-pin" strategy, and
has arrested the Zetas and Gulf cartel leaders since taking office. See Archibold,
supra note 11; Anahi Rama & Elinor Comlay, Mexico Captures Gulf CartelLeader,
NBC
NEWS
(Aug.
18,
2013),
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/
_news/2013/08/18/20070390-mexico-captures-gulf-cartel-leader. Furthermore, the
Mexican government increased extraditions to the United States, thus increasing the
chances to convict and imprison these individuals in an unbiased, non-corrupt
system. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 25; Reid, supra note 14, at 408-09.
35. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 13.
36. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 18. The concept of the " 2 1st century
border" is new and more complex than a line between the two countries. Id. The
United States Department of State developed a new framework focusing on "the
principles of joint border management, co-responsibility for cross-border crime, and
shared commitment to the efficient flow of legal commerce and travel." United
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strong and resilient communities." 37 Under the new paradigm, the
United States and Mexico's goal of the Mrida Initiative transformed
from solely military assistance and training to "addressing the weak
government institutions and underlying societal problems" that
allowed the DTO's perpetual growth and success in Mexico." This
meant that Mexico, with the aid of the United States, would confront
their problem of corruption within all levels of the government, the
human rights violations perpetuated by the military as they fought the
DTOs, and the problem of complete community distrust for the
39
government.
A. Addressing the Weak Government Institutions and Societal
Problemsunder PillarH1 and IV of the MridaInitiative
In the early stages, the tactics in pillar I of the Mrida Initiative
led to the capture of many of the DTO leaders. 40 Yet today, the DTOs
States-Mexico Partnership:A New Border Vision, U.S DEP'T ST. (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138926.htm. The proposed 21st century
border is based on (1) enhancing public safety from the criminal organizations, (2)
securing flows of people and goods using tools that prevent illegitimate trade and
travel, (3) expediting legitimate commerce and travel by including the private sector
and investing in people, technology and infrastructure, (4) engaging border
communities, and (5) setting policy in statutory, regulatory and infrastructure
systems. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 18. Although a plan is in place by
the State Department, there are concerns with which country assumes responsibility
with both the northbound and the southbound entries into both countries and how
each country's resources should be used. Id. at 19. Current practices include the use
of non-intrusive inspection systems and customs training to support
professionalization of Mexican customs department. Id.
37. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 20; GAO Report, supra note 17, at 6;
Merida Initiative, U.S DEP'T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014).
38. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 47 (statement of Clare Seelke, Specialist in
Latin American Affairs, Cong. Research Serv.).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime) (twenty-five out of thirty-seven leaders were captured under
President Calder6n.); SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that the
United States and Mexico's early focus was focused to "dismantling the leadership
of the major DTOs."); see also FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 28, at 2

(explaining that in the early stages of Calder6n's presidency, Mexico saw success
with the capture of cartel leader Teodoro Garcia Simental and the killing of another
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are persistent in continuing their illegal activities and remain
successful in their efforts. 4 1 A strong reason for their success is
Mexico's problem with corruption. Mexico currently suffers from a
corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system, and estimates from one
study indicate "that ninety-eight percent of those arrested for
organized crime are set free." 4 2 The criminal justice system is based
on a closed-door inquisitorial process where the prosecutor has
"plenary power" to enter almost any evidence, and the defense's
evidence may be limited in its validity compared to that of the
prosecutor.4 3 Since the judge and the prosecutor are the determinants
for a conviction and maintain a strong hold on what evidence is
entered into a proceeding, in Mexico's closed-door system, there is
more susceptibility for bribery."
The Mexican police force, and its infrastructure, is also plagued
by corruption. Less than thirteen percent of the crimes that occur in
the country are reported, and this is due to the Mexican population's
distrust of the police. 4 5 DTO leaders spend a portion of their wealth
bribing government officials, including high-ranking officials in the
police force. 4 6 These bribes ensure that the DTOs gain loyalty and

known cartel leader Arturo Beltrdn Leyva).
41. See generally JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG., RESEARCH SERV., R 41576,
MEXICO'S DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE
VIOLENCE 6 (2013) (describing the DTOs as businesses looking for more efficient
ways to "maximize their profits" while increasing their control of the illegal drugs
market in the United States).

42. See Bergal, supra note 33, at 1068 (citing David Luhnow & Nicholas
Casey, Felipe Calderdn - Interview Transcript, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870395790457525255154849
8376.
43. William Hine-Ramsberger, Drug Violence and Constitutional Revisions:
Mexico's 2008 CriminalJustice System Reform and the Formation of Rule of Law,
37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 291, 295 (2011).
44. Id. at 299.
45. SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 13; CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43001, SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM IN
MEXICO: THE U.S. ROLE 2 (2013) [hereinafter SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM INMEXICO]; see DAVID A. SHIRKE, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN REL., THE DRUG
WAR IN MEXICO: CONFRONTING A SHARED THREAT 11 (2011), available at
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/drug-war-mexico/p24262.

46. See Wright, supra note 33, at 365-66.
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assistance from the police force, thus reducing the chances of
convictions for the perpetrators and justice for the victims of the
violence. 47 "It is estimated that six out of ten crimes in Mexico
involve some form of police complicity." 48
The police force is also known to serve as "spies, assassins,
weapons providers and escorts" to many of the DTOs, 4 9 showing
further compliance with the perpetrators responsible for most of the
violent crimes in Mexico. Additionally, impunity is a cultural norm;
therefore, even if the police are caught violating the law with their
corrupt activities, there is no punishment for their violations.o The
combination of the lucrative bribes the DTOs provide to all levels of
ranking police officials and the high impunity rates creates a breeding
ground for corruption to thrive in a system the Mexican public does
not trust.
Along with corruption, Mexico also faces issues pertaining to
Since former President Calder6n
human rights violations.
implemented the use of the Federal police and the military to combat
the DTOs, there has been a significant increase in human rights
violations as well as the inability of the government to investigate and
prosecute these claims of abuse. 5 1 Human rights violations in Mexico
and
abuse, torture,
include unlawful killings, physical
disappearances. 52 These crimes are brought before the military justice
system, which does not have adequate resources to handle the
significant increase in claims against the military for human rights

47. See BEITTEL, supra note 41, at 7.
48. Justin B. Shapiro, What are They Smoking?! Mexico's Decriminalization
of Small-Scale Drug Possession in the Wake of a Law Enforcement Failure,42 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 115, 126 (2010) (footnote omitted).
49. Hearing, supra note 16, at 67 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
50. See Shapiro, supra note 48, at 127.
51. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 13; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 23 ("From January 2007 to mid-November 2012, Mexico's
National Human Rights Commission issued detailed reports of 109 cases in which it
found that members of the army had committed serious human rights violations, and
received complaints of 7,350 military abuses.").
52. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, 246
(2013), availableat https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

11

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2014], Art. 6

236

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

violations. 53 As a result, impunity rates with human rights violations
remain high, further decimating any confidence the community may
have for the government to protect their safety. These human rights
violations and corrupt institutions symbolize a weak infrastructure that
the Mexican communities do not trust. 54
Although great concerns of corruption and human rights
violations surround Mexico, under former President Calder6n,
reformation through the early stages of the M6rida Initiative laid the
foundation for changes in both the justice system and the police
force.55 A significant amount of attention was placed on purging
many of the state and local police officers that failed to meet anticorruption standards. 56 Police reform also included training for more
than 19,000 federal and state police officers, and expanding
incarceration security at the federal level.5 7 Furthermore, in 2008,
President Calder6n amended the Mexican Constitution to reform the
criminal justice system from a closed-door inquisitorial process to an
open, accusatorial and oral process, similar to the United States justice

53. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23. Changes are occurring to meet
the substantial increase in human rights violations. See id. (In August 2012, the
[Mexican] Supreme Court ruled that the killing of an unarmed man by soldiers at a
military checkpoint should be prosecuted in civilian jurisdiction, and that the article
of the Military Code of Justice used to claim jurisdiction over human rights cases
was unconstitutional."); Mexico's Supreme Court Decides to End Military
Jurisdictionfor Soldiers Who Commit Human Rights Violations, WASH. OFF. ON
LATIN AM. (July 13, 2011), http://www.wola.org/commentary/mexico-s_
supreme court decidestoendmilitaryjurisdiction forsoldierswhocommithu
man [hereinafter WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM.].
54. See generally Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 43, at 299-300.
55. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 10.
56. Over 3,200 police officers were fired in the anti-corruption drive and 1,020
federal officers were disciplined for failing tests that identified susceptibility to
bribes. Thomas Black and Jens Erik Gould, Mexico Purges3,200 Police Officers in
Anti-Corruption Drive, WASH.
POST (Aug. 30, 2010,
1:05 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/30/AR2010083
002738.html. Police forces throughout the states of Mexico implemented
competence tests that included honesty tests. Stephen Gibbs, Mexican Purge Axes
CorruptPolice, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8356140.stm (last
updated Nov. 12, 2009). In Monterrey, over 270 police officers were dismissed and
an additional 500 were sent for more training. Id.
57. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 10.
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system. 58 The hope is that by 2016, all states in Mexico will
implement the changes under the judicial reform. 59 Additionally, both
the United States and Mexico realized that tackling the drug violence
in Mexico with military tactics was simply not enough. President
Obama's paradigm shift symbolized that belief when he incorporated
pillar IV into the Mrida Initiative.
To address the community's distrust of the government, a new
paradigm includes "building resilient communities" as the fourth pillar
of the Mrida Initiative. 60 The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) currently implements the Mrida Initiative's
fourth pillar. 6 1 USAID works with at-risk youth in the border-states
most vulnerable to drug trafficking and the DTOs. 62 Cities include
Ciudad Jutrez and Tijuana, and the USAID implemented programs
have resulted in employment opportunities for youth participants,
reenrollment in schools, and violence prevention training. 63
Preliminary data, based on the programs implemented in the two
cities, shows promising results, and nine additional master plans have
been developed in target communities to continue the work of
building resilient communities.6

58. See Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 43, at 301.
59. See id. at 302.
60. The purpose of the fourth pillar is to address the underlying cause of crime
and violence that plagued the communities. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18,
at 20. It seeks to bring the communities in as a component to fight the DTOs by
empowering the local leaders, civil society representatives, and the private sector.
Id.
61. See Hearing, supra note 16, at 27 (statement of Elizabeth Hogan, Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean). USAID's
current strategy is based on three objectives: "(1) [i]mproving federal, state and local
government capacity to safeguard citizen security; (2) catalyzing public and private
sector resources to expand socio-economic opportunities in the regions most
affected by crime; and (3) increasing youth capacity to play a constructive role in
their communities by keeping youth in school, developing their job skills, and
supporting family counseling and social integration activities." Youth and
Community,
USAID,
http://usaid.gov/where-we-work/latin-american-andcaribbean/mexico/youth-and-community (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
62. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 27 (statement of Elizabeth Hogan, Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean).
63. USAID, supra note 61.
64. Id. "More than 1,000 youth participated in life-skills and employability

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2014], Art. 6

238

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

B. A New Mexican Presidentand a New Perspective
Further changes occurred July 2012 with the election of President
Pefia Nieto, under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). 65
Although the change of the president in Mexico usually leads to an
"overhaul of governmental structures and organizational patterns," 66
President Peia Nieto has made clear that his intentions are to continue
implementing the M6rida Initiative and maintaining a close
collaboration with the United States on security issues, specifically
targeting crime prevention and the rule of law. 67 President Pefia Nieto
outlined six action plans to his security strategy in Mexico: "planning,
social prevention, human rights, inter-governmental coordination,
justice reform, and evaluation and feedback." 68
Additionally,
President Pefia Nieto proposed reformations under five pillars:
training, and over 740 students participated in after-school programs in Ciudad
Juarez and Tijuana. In Ciudad Juarez, 70% of 638 youth who participated in
programs have returned to school . . . [and] 88% of 624 youth re-enrolled in middle
school after participating in summer camps . . . ." Id. (alteration in original).

65. Felipe Calder6n's National Action Party (PAN) was more conservative
when addressing Mexican issues plaguing the country; the change meant a new
perspective in the way Mexico would address the problems associated with the
DTOs and violence in Mexico. Tim Padgett, How Enrique Pefia Nieto Won Himself
and His Party the Mexican Presidency, TIME MAGAZINE (July 2, 2012),

http://www.world.time.com/2012/07/02/mexico-election-how-enrique-pena-nietowon-himself-and-his-party-the-presidency/.
66. PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 3.

67. Hearing, supra note 16, at 16 (statement of John D. Feeley, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs).
68. Id. at 22. President Pefia Nieto's security strategy, known as "Mexico in
Peace" primarily aims to reduce the violent crime in Mexico. PRIORITIES AND KEY

ISSUES, supra note 12, at 7. The strategy in the six specific areas includes: "better
government planning that would result in a reduction in violence and clear,
measurable results; increases in crime prevention programs and social investments
to give young people alternatives to crime; a commitment to protect human rights;
improved inter-governmental coordination among federal agencies and between
federal, state and municipal governments; continuation of institutional reform and
strengthening efforts; and, continuous evaluation of government programs for
effectiveness with adjustments made based on these evaluations." Eric L. Olson, The
Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, in NEW IDEAS FOR A NEW ERA:
POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN U.S.-MEXIco RELATIONS, 17, 20 (2013),

available
era.pdf.

at

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new ideas-new_
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"reducing violence, combating poverty, boosting economic growth,
reforming education, and fostering social responsibility." 69 All of the
five pillars tackle individual problems, but the grand scheme centers
around making Mexico the vibrant, economically successful, and
strong country it can be.
President's Pefia Nieto's security strategy and reformation plan
for Mexico fall in line with the second and fourth pillar of the M~rida
Initiative. Although the suspension of funding for the M~rida
Initiative shows some doubt as to whether President Pefia Nieto is
serious about combating the DTOs,7 0 President Pefia Nieto's six
action security plan focuses on continuing the rule of law reformation,
specifically in the justice system, and also strengthening the Mexican
communities that can assist in tackling the DTOs' strong presence in
the country.
President Pefia Nieto's strategy, which aligns with pillar II of the
Mrida Initiative, includes "strengthening the Attorney General's
office, [and] revising the practice of pre-trial detention to better
protect human rights ... ."71
The Attorney General, Jesus Murillo
Karam, is the current architect of the justice system reformation, and
69. PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 6.
70. Sen. Patrick Leahy Blocks $95M in Mirida Initiative Funds, MEX. GULF
REPORTER (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.mexicogulfreporter.com/2013/08/senpatrick-leahy-blocks-95m-in-merida.html (noting that funds for the M6rida Initiative
have been frozen since February, 2013 due to the Senator's belief that President
Nieto is not doing enough to go after the DTOs or disrupt their industry, thereby
closing the funds to Mexico that were initially to be distributed in January 2013); see
Laura Carlsen, Suspensi6n de Fondos a la Iniciativa Mirida Salvard Vidas, PRENSA
SAN DIEGO (Aug. 23, 2013), http://laprensa-sandiego.org/stories/suspension-defondos-a-la-iniciativa-merida-salvara-vidas/
(discussing how Senator Patrick
Leahy's concerns relate to a lack of clear strategy by the United States Department
of State and the Mexican government, and increasing human rights violations).
71. U.S.-Mexico Security Relationship: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on W.
Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of William R. Brownfield, Assistant Sec'y of the
Bureau
of
Int'l
Narcotics
and
Law
Enforcement
Affairs),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BrownfieldTestimony.pdf.
The
Mexican system is currently undergoing a transition from an inquisitorial, closed
system where the detained individual is held during the evidentiary stage of the
proceeding known as the arraigo. See Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 43, at 292-96.
This process may take years to conclude, so during that time the person is held
without receiving a final verdict. Id. at 298.
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works with the United States Department of Justice to ensure that the
deadlines within the plans of reformation are met. 72 By strengthening
the office, Attorney General Karam has more discretion and
opportunity to implement these changes. Attorney General Karam has
stated that it is fundamentally important to continue collaborations
with the United States. 73 By strengthening his decision-making, it
should translate as a forward step towards continuing the justice
system reformation under the M6rida Initiative and maintaining a
close collaboration with the United States in the process.
Additionally, President Pefia Nieto's strategy in revising the pretrial detention falls directly in line with reforming the rule of law.
One of the key strategies addressed in the judicial system reformation
is revising pre-trial detention by limiting this action to perpetrators
and persons accused of violent crimes. 74 Furthermore, the Mexican
government has sought additional assistance from the United States
government in implementing this judicial reform. 75 President Pefia
Nieto understands that an effective plan of reformation requires the
assistance of the United States because the reformed system is
currently modeled after the United States judicial system. 76
For the Mexican government to continue implementing the plan,
they require that United States advisors assist in ensuring that the plan
is not only instilled, but also successfully implemented. President
Pefia Nieto demonstrates that he intends to tackle the specific
problems within the current justice system. By strengthening the
office of Attorney General, he demonstrates his continued
commitment to reformations of pre-trial detentions, one of the key
strategies of the overall justice system reformation. Furthermore, by
seeking the assistance of the United States Department of Justice to
72. SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO, supra note 45, at 13-

14.
73. Transforming Justice in Mexico: Discussion with Mexico's Attorney
General Jesds

Murillo

Karam,

WILSON

CENTER

(Sept.

10,

2013),

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/murillo-karam.
74. SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM INMEXICO, supra note 45, at 5.
75. See PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 16.

76. See Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 43, at 292. See generally SUPPORTING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO, supra note 45, at 4 (stating that the move is

towards an "adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption
of innocence until proven guilty.").
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implement the reformations, he is aligning himself to the Calder6n
2008 amendments and the M6rida Initiative's plan
To align with the fourth pillar of the Mrida Initiative, President
Pefia Nieto further emphasized the importance of building strong and
resilient communities by introducing his pillars of "reducing violence;
combating poverty; boosting economic growth; reforming education;
and fostering social responsibility." 77 President Pefia Nieto has
created the "Mexico Crime and Violence Prevention Program," and
aims to use the program to strengthen the local, state and federal
governments with their efforts at policy making and identifying
resources to fight crime.7 8 The program enlists the help of the
International City/County Management Association ("ICMA") to
create "municipal violence and crime prevention committees ...
which [assist in] monitoring crime prevention initiatives in the
community."7 9 They are in the stages of developing a manual for
community policing, which in turn incorporates the community in the
government's crime prevention efforts.80 The creation of the National
Crime and Violence Prevention Program demonstrates that President
77.

PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 6.

78. Mexico Crime and Violence Prevention Program, ICMA INT'L,
http://icma.org/en/international/projects/directory/Project/1040/MexicoCrime-and_
ViolencePreventionProgram [hereinafter ICMA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). The
program is currently funded through the USAID for three years. Id. Its aim is to
support "urban and social planning to strengthen crime and violence prevention; ...
[improve] the capacity of local government to incorporate community stakeholders
into its budgeting process to increase public and private investments in violence
prevention; and.. . promot[e] community policing to improve relationships between
municipal police and the community through the ICMA CityLinks[] approach." Id.
79. Id.; Who We Are: ICMA: Leaders at the Core of Better Communities,
ICMA,
http://icma.org/en/icma/about/organization overview/who-we-are (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014). ICMA is a non-profit organization under Mexican law which
"serves as a base to promote professional management in subnational governments
in the region, carrying out ICMA's mission. . . ." ICMA Mixico-Latinoambrica,
ICMA INT'L, http://icma.org/en/intemational/about/ icma latino america (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014). ICMA provides "[r]esources, information, and training on
good governance through [their] Web site. . . ." Id. They also provide "[a]ssessment
instruments and other programs that strengthen subnational institutional
capacity. . ." and they offer "[o]pportunities for interaction among Mexican
administrators, officials, and local government organizations ... and their
counterparts in the United States. Id.
80. ICMA, supra note 78.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

17

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2014], Art. 6

242

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

Pefia Nieto's interest is aligned with the fourth pillar of the M6rida
Initiative. The funding comes from USAID,' the resource used for
the fourth pillar under former President Calder6n, and they continue to
positively impact the communities in Mexico. Furthermore, the
program is at the beginning stages of creating a community policing
manual, an empowering tool to assist in building strong and resilient
communities.
President Pefia Nieto's security plan is also aimed to protect and
respect human rights in Mexico. 82 The fourth pillar of the initiative,
under the USAID implementation, focuses on supporting the Mexican
government in providing life and job skills for at-risk youth in three
cities: Ciudad Juirez, Monterrey, and Tijuana. 83 They also provide
educational opportunities within the cities, and they improve the local
governments' capacity to assist with citizen safety and address root
causes of crime and violence. 84 The Mexican government, under
President Pefia Nieto, and USAID show the collaborative efforts that
have shined throughout the M6rida Initiative. Both parties are
tackling issues with employment and educational opportunities, which
are imperative to building a strong community. Furthermore, both
parties demonstrate an emphasis on youth, which are the most
susceptible to the DTOs' influence. USAID and President Pefia
Nieto's plans are working to find alternative ways to reduce the
DTO's hold on territory by reducing their chances to control the
community through the youth.
President Pefia Nieto demonstrates in his strategy an inherent
understanding of the purpose of the four pillars of the M6rida
Initiative. He sees that although combating the DTOs is still a
priority, the problems' roots go deeper into society with the lack of
rule of law, violation of human rights, and community distrust. By
8 1. Id.
82. PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 7. The Mexican government

has allocated "a $9 billion budget that includes socioeconomic, education,
infrastructure, and drug treatment programs." Id.
83. Testimony of Mark Feierstein,Assistant Administratorfor Latin America
and the Caribbean, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee,
USAID
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.usaid.gov/newsinformation/congressional-testimony/june-18-2013-testimony-mark-feiersteinsecurity-cooperation-mexico.
84. Id.
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proclaiming the important task of rebuilding the communities after
years of drug violence and turmoil, President Pefia Nieto has aligned
himself with the United States and pillar II and IV of the M6rida
Initiative.
While concrete examples show how President Pefia Nieto's plan
aligns with the M6rida Initiative, doubts also stem from his security
strategy plan. Some experts find that President Pefia Nieto's move to
centralize security policy is an indication that he is more skeptical of
the United States/Mexico collaboration.8 5 Furthermore, President
Peila Nieto "plac[ed] the Federal Police and intelligence service under
the authority of the Interior Secretary," which Representative Albio
Sires of New Jersey indicated could pose a setback in cooperation in
the federal agencies for both countries working together.8 6 Lastly,
"[e]ight months into his administration, the jury is still out on Pefia
Nieto's security strategy," and some argue that he has yet to
concretely define those security priorities and how they will be
accomplished.8
While it is common that change in leadership will lead to change
in the workings of a program such as the M6rida Initiative, President
Pefia Nieto has shown continual commitment to implement the
reforms and changes stemming from the M6rida Initiative. The
concerns addressed by the Subcommittee of Foreign Affairs seem to
originate from logistics on which government agency shall be
responsible for each program,8 8 and not from a disconnect from the
M6rida Initiative. 89 While valid, they tend to be minor setbacks from
the overall scheme of the M6rida Initiative. As with any new leader
coming in to run a country, each one wants to distinguish themselves
85. See Hearing, supra note 16, at 3 (statement of Rep. Albio Sires,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs).
86. Id.
87. PRIORITIES AND KEY IssuEs, supra note 12, at 7.
88. See id. at 3 (describing how Mexican presidential transitions are
characterized by turnovers within the government agencies, and overhaul of
governmental structure and organizational patterns).
89. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 16 (testimony of John D. Feeley, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs)
(describing how Pefia Nieto and his team made clear their continued interest to
collaborate with the United States on security matters, including crime prevention
and rule of law).
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in their approach to a plan instilled by a former President, and these
changes take time to implement with the checks and balances of a
country. Yet, the overall scheme, through current strategies, plans of
action, and concrete examples, point President Pefia Nieto in the
direction that aligns itself with both the United States and the M6rida
Initiative.
President Pefia Nieto maintains a willingness to continue
Mexico's committed collaboration with the United States on the
M6rida Initiative. Former President Calder6n and President Obama
shifted the goals to ensure that a complete overhaul of Mexico's
security policy resulted in both the empowerment of the country and
elimination of violence. 90 Yet building a resilient community requires
that the community be involved in the reformation process, along with
the judicial system and the police force. One approach that has
proven tremendously successful, both in the United States and other
nations, is the concept of community policing.
III. COMMUNITY POLICING: A NEW APPROACH TO POLICE AND
CITIZEN INTERACTION IN MEXICO

The paradigm shift under the Obama Administration, and
President Pefia Nieto's security strategy plan, led to many questions
on how to implement the new pillars under the M6rida Initiative.
USAID currently laid the foundation for both pillar II and IV by
assisting with the justice reformation and including at-risk youth in
their plan to quell the violence in the Mexican border-states. 9 1
However, incorporating community policing can create a more
systematic and foundational change with both the rule of law and
building resilient communities, thereby getting deeper to the root of
the problem plaguing Mexico. Implementing the community policing
model requires extensive understanding of its purpose, approaches,
strengths, weaknesses, and goals to ensure that it not only meets the
individualistic needs of the communities in Mexico, but also succeeds
both in the short-term and long-term goals of the M6rida Initiative.

90. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supranote 18, at 6-7.
91. See Hearing, supra note 16, at 27 (statement of Elizabeth Hogan, Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean).
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The development of community policing came to fruition in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s when protests against the
Vietnam War and the Civil Rights movement led to police-community
interactions that were reactive and negative for both the police and the
community. 92 The negative interactions between citizens and the
police led to a reduction of reported crime, and so the police and
government changed their approach when interacting with the
community to develop a sense of trust between the two." In the
1990s, the United States Federal government took note of the
community policing module and backed the program financially. 94
In 1994, the United States, under the Department of Justice,
developed the Federal Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS)
program to advance the concept of community policing and provide
funding to law enforcement implementing their own modules. 95
92. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY
POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 6-7 (1994) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
COMMUNITY POLICING], availableat http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf. The
crime rate rose dramatically in the 1960s and continued to rise into the mid-1970s.
Matt Wawrzyn, Chicago v. Morales: ConstitutionalPrinciplesat Loggerheads with
Community Action, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2000). Many of the riots in the
1960s occurred to challenge the police tactics and were sparked by incidents with
the police. Id. Once the police realized their tactics were resulting in community
resentment, experimentation on new police tactics began, thus laying the foundation
of community policing in the United States. See id. at 376-77.
93. UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 7. One of the
earliest examples was through the San Diego Police Department and the
community-oriented policing project (COP). Id. at 8-9. COP required patrol officers
to be knowledgeable about their patrol runs in the demographics, topography and
call history of the city. Id. at 9. The project showed that better police interaction with
the community improved attitudes towards police responsibilities and the
communities they served; it also produced both innovative and creative solutions to
the problems that plagued the local communities. Id.
94. See Reisig, supra note 26, at 2.
95. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R40709, COMMUNITY ORIENTED
POLICING SERVICES (COPS): CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 1 (2010); Reisig, supra
note 26, at 2 ("From 1995 to 2008, the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) program awarded more than $ 13 billion in grants to local police agencies to
hire community policing officers and foster police-community problem
solving ... .".). The COPS program was enacted through the "Public Safety
Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994, Title I of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act ... ." U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-97-167, COMMUNITY POLICING: ISSUES RELATED TO THE DESIGN,
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Many cities, including Los Angeles and Chicago, have addressed their
problems of crime and safety with their own versions of community
policing, and it has shown to be a step towards encouraging the local
communities to actively collaborate with law enforcement in their
Community policing can
efforts to solve these problems. 9 6
fundamentally change Mexico's relationship between the communities
and the government. If implemented correctly, it can transform the
country from a state of perpetual violence to a strong nation of
courageous individuals willing to protect their homes, their neighbors,
and their country.
A. Components of Community Policing:Preventionis Better
than the Cure9 7
As a basic foundation to community policing, the concept varies
depending on the approach the police, local government and the
community take when interacting with one another. At its core,
however, community policing is an organizational strategy with many
multifaceted features 98 :
[I]t requires that citizens, at the neighborhood level, meet regularly
with police to jointly define neighborhood crime problems and set
police priorities[, which] serves four functions: (1) it allows the
neighborhood residents to express their concerns and needs; (2) it
gives the police a forum to educate citizens about neighborhood
crime issues; (3) it allows the neighborhoods to state complaints
about the police themselves; and (4) it gives police a chance to
report back on what actions they have taken and what successes ...

OF THE GRANT PROGRAM 1 (1997) (footnote
omitted).
96. See Community Policing Unit: Opportunities, L.A. POLICE DEP'T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/support_1apd/content basic view/731 (last visited Feb. 1,
CHI. POLICE, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/
2014);
What is CAPS,
portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%2OCAPS%20works/What%20i
s%20CAPS (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
97. Ogadimma Chukwubueze Arisukwu, Community-Oriented Policing in
Nigeria:A Focus on Adatan, Ogun State, 85 POLICE J. 319, 320 (2012), available at
http://vathek.org/doi/pdf/10.1350/pojo.2012.85.4.583.
98. James Forman, Jr., Criminal Law: Community Policing and Youth as
OPERATION, AND MANAGEMENT

Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (2004).
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they have had 99
Aside from the communication component discussed above, a
plan for solving the issues raised in the meetings is also essential to
develop an effective framework of community policing.' 00 This can
mean a variety of approaches in tackling the problems raised at the
meetings; it can mean that the police eliminate the problem in its
entirety, reduce the number of instances of the same problem, reduce
the degree of injury within the problem, and/or treat a problem in a
more humane fashion. 101

The underlying process would be a combination of information
gathering, or communication between the police force and the
community, followed by problem solving methods to resolve the
issues raised in the information gathering stage, which would then
create a cycle that aims to build trust between the police and the
community.' 02 The end result would mean that more people are
willing to bring up issues that affect the local community with the
assurance that the issue will be resolved, thus creating a continuum of
information gathering and problem solving between the police force
and the community.' 03 Community policing is one approach to
restore the community trust and deal with adversarial relationships
between the police and disadvantaged communities.1 04

99. Id. (footnotes omitted).
100. See UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 17-18.

101. Id. at 20. An example would be addressing a rise in domestic violence
disputes in a local community. Id. The police may notice when they get a call from
dispatch that the perpetrator in most instances is intoxicated and that the crimes are
occurring regularly during nighttime hours. Id. Community members may then
discuss the fact that there is an after-hours illegal night club where a good portion of
the perpetrators enjoy their time. Id. The police, local leaders, local government
officials, and the general community may then hold a meeting to find out proper
methods to close down the club with little hostility from the business owner. Id.
Furthermore, special interest groups, police, and the local government may then
work together to establish shelters for battered women and rehabilitation centers,
thus stopping the problem of the illegal night club, and helping those affected by
both the alcohol abuse and the spousal abuse as a result of the excessive drinking.
Id.
102. See id. at 19.
103. Id.
104. Forman, Jr., supra note 98, at 8.
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B. Successful Programsof Community Policing in the United
States and the World
Community policing can be implemented in a variety of different
approaches, each tailored to the needs of the city. One excellent
example of community policing is through the city of Chicago and
their "Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy" (CAPS) program.os in
the 1990s, Chicago went through a significant increase in crime rates,
including homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults.' 0 6 As a
response to the high rates in crime, the city took action by reforming
the police and ensuring that in their new era of crime, a more effective
police force would assist in reducing the crime problem; thus the
community policing model was implemented in the city.107
Chicago uses a "problem-solving" model; it defines a persistent
problem that continually occurs and concerns a significant portion of
members in the neighborhood. 0 8 The police, who are designated to
patrol and protect a section of the city, thereby use a five-step process:
"(1) identify and prioritize the problem, (2) analyze the problem, (3)
design response strategies, (4) implement response strategies, and (5)
assess the success of response strategies." 09 This process is
conducted through the Beat Meetings throughout the city where the
aim is provide residents a forum to discuss chronic problems and
engage in the five-step process to solve these chronic problems.1 10
105. How CAPS Works, CHI. POLICE, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/
portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%2OCAPS%20works
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2014).
106. Wawrzyn, supra note 92, at 371.
107. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY

POLICING: CHICAGO STYLE, 38-41 (1997) (discussing the changes in the leadership
of the Chicago police, including the change from an "old school" superintendent cop
to a more progressive candidate in terms of accepting the change to community
policing; at the same time that these leadership changes occurred, the mayor was
transitioning into the experimental phase of community policing).
108. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM SOLVING
IN PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO 1, 3 (2000),

available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.
109. WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, TAKING STOCK:

COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO 4 (2002) (alteration in original), available at

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/1 89909.pdf.
110. The meetings are held monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly throughout the
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Other cities in the United States have their own versions of
community policing, including Los Angeles and Boston."' Boston's
crime problem grew tremendously when hostilities between the police
and the inner-city community augmented substantially.112 Boston's
community policing model had two interconnected approaches. First,
it tackled the homicide rate in a highly concentrated area because it
realized that "less than one percent of the adolescents and postadolescent[s in the area were] responsible for sixty percent of the of
the city's homicides."" 3 At the same time, Boston addressed the
issue of police harassment by working with its community leaders;
city officials worked in inner-city churches, and church ministers were
effective intermediaries "due to their close connections with
neighborhood youth and long history of speaking against police
abuse." 1 4 Looking at Boston's model, the police took on both the
immediate need to quell the violent homicide crimes, and at the same
time, they took responsibility for harassing the youth by reaching out
to individuals that would create the platform to mend a broken
relationship and instill trust.
Countries throughout the world also implement forms of
community policing into their local police departments, including
Great Britain, Singapore, and Japan."' Japan currently has the oldest

285 beats in Chicago. What Are Beat Meetings ... And Why Are They Important?,
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/
CHI.
POLICE,
Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/Beat%2OMeetings (last visited Nov. 30,
2013)
111. ANDREA SCHNEIDER ET AL., COMMUNITY POLICING IN ACTION!: A
PRACTITIONER'S EYE VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 15 (2003), available at
L.A.
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/communitypolicinginaction.pdf;
POLICE DEP'T, supra note 96.
112. See Forman, Jr., supra note 98, at 38.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 38-39.
115. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
COMMUNITY POLICING: ISSUES AND PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD 4-7 (1988),

http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024885173;
at
available
view-lup;seq=3. The London Metropolitan Police implement the "Neighborhood
Watch" program, the centerpiece of their community crime-prevention. Id. at 4.
Japan's community involvement is through custom; membership is automatic and
leaders provided mediation services, "organized neighborhood improvement
campaigns, [and] communicated information about local concerns ... ." Id. at 5.
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community policing program in the world, which was created after
World War II.116 The government has built local police stations
approximately six to seven blocks apart, their policemen are on foot,
and they respond to citizens' request for services."' Furthermore,
twice a year, policemen visit the homes and businesses of their
neighborhoods to inquire about the problems of the neighborhood,
inform the citizens of the area, and use their time for crime-prevention
and security inspections." 8
These models are just a few of the variety of ways to implement
community policing. As a preliminary component, it is essential that
the country tailor its policy over its immediate and long-term needs.
With the assistance of the United States under the M6rida Initiative,
Mexico can implement community policing into the communities
most affected by the drug violence as short-term form of relief, and
possibly into the entire country as a long term goal, with an
organization plan similar to the United States' COPS program.
IV.

A FEDERAL PROGRAM

OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN MEXICO:
CONNECTING PILLAR II AND PILLAR IV OF THE MtRIDA
INITIATIVE

Following along in the footsteps of former President Calder6n,
President Pefia Nieto has a great task ahead of him in dealing with the
DTOs. His goals for Mexico and for his security strategy plan are "to
reduce violent crime," maintain a low-key approach to arresting the
DTO leaders, and to create a national prevention program that would
include "socioeconomic, education, infrastructure, and drug treatment
programs."ll 9 Aligning his goals with tackling the weak institutions
and building strong resilient communities could mean that a federal
Singapore conducts their own version of the "Neighborhood Watch" Program,
which covers half of the population. Id. at 7.
116. Id.at3l.
117. David Bayley, The State of the Art in Community Policing: An
International Perspective, in AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE POLICE & THE COMMUNiTY 7 (Sandra McKillop &

Julia Vernon, eds., 1992), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/medialibrary/
publications/proceedings/05/bayley.pdf.
118. Id.
119. PRIORITIES AND KEY IssuEs, supra note 12, at 7.
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program, similar to that of the COPS program by the Department of
Justice, would be the key step in bringing his goals to reality.
Under pillar II of the M6rida Initiative, the Mexican government,
with the guide of the United States Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and USAID, can incorporate community
policing into their training programs for the federal, state and local
police forces. Former President Calder6n purged many of the
precincts from the corrupt policemen that decimated any trust that
existed between the public and the government,120 and therefore it
would be an opportune moment to instill a comprehensive community
policing program to new members.
Since the Mexican government has a great task of building trust
for the local police enforcement, a program similar to the "Broken
Windows Theory" would be an excellent start at gaining
Under the "Broken Windows Theory," the
momentum.121
government sees two dimensions to a community's problem: social
disorder and physical disorder. 122 These two dimensions instill a fear
and lack of safety within the community.123 Physical and social
disorder fester the underlying serious crimes that take hold of the
community, but they can be remedied through different methods like
making use of abandoned buildings or cleaning up graffiti. 124

120. .See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SEC., Mexico 2013
Crime and Safety Report: Nuevo Laredo (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Mexico 2013
Crime & Safety Report], available at https://www.osac.gov/pages/
ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=14358; Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Fired 3,200
2010),
31,
(Aug.
TIMES
L.A.
Officers,
Police
Federal
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/31/world/la-fg-mexico-police-fired-20100831.
121. See Reisig, supra note 26, at 24.
122. Id. The social disorder consists of problems that are "boorish and
threatening," such as "aggressive panhandling, street prostitution, public drinking
and drug use, and urinating in public spaces." Id. The physical disorder "refers to
visual signs of negligence and unchecked decay," such as broken streetlights and
windows, vacant lots filled with garbage, abandoned ... buildings and cars, and
gang graffiti .

. ."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

123. See id. at 25.
124. Id. at 29 (describing the Chicago solution to fixing the physical disorder
with police intervention significantly improving neighborhood conditions in the area
studied.) The city of Chandler, Arizona "emphasized order maintenance and zoning
ordinance enforcement to address disorder problems" which resulted in a significant
decrease in the number of service calls related to "public moral offenses." Id. at 30
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The police would be trained to work with the local government to
ensure that these problems are resolved through an overhaul and
systematic training. To address the issue of individuals causing these
small problems in the community, policemen would be trained in the
concept of mediation and counseling, using non-arrest methods, such
as "persuasion, counseling, and ordering" to resolve the small
problems that do not necessarily require the police to book the
individuals causing the problems. 125 If these approaches do not
resolve the problem, then strict adherence to arresting individuals for
misdemeanors would be the next step.1 26
After a systematic training of all local police enforcement, their
roles would expand from handling crimes within the area to also
assisting the local government with solving small, but powerful
problems within the community. 27 These problems would be
addressed on a routine basis,128 and the policemen would have
discretion, with feedback from the community through the community
meetings, as to the seriousness of the problem and the immediate need
to solve it. 129 The local police force would be focused on the
community, tackling non-DTO crimes and fixing social and physical
problems within the community to gain their trust. The federal police,
on the other hand, would continue to fight against the DTOs and
ensure that they do not impede on the local police's progress within
the community.
An emphasis on the "Broken Windows Theory" is based on
training the local and state police force due to the discretional power
that is granted under the theory;' 30 this training can result through the
(citation omitted).
125. Id. at 27.
126. Id.
127. See UNDERSTANDING

COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 21

(providing example of a patrol officer talking to members of the neighborhood to
find out about the problems of lighting in certain neighborhood, which if solved, can
decrease the incidents of mugging). See generally Reisig, supra note 26, at 24-25
(discussing how physical disorder creates a profound sense of fear in the
neighborhood).
128. See Reisig, supra note 26, at 26.
129. UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 17, 22.

130. See Reisig, supra note 26, at 26 (stating that police officers "must
determine the seriousness of the offense in context ... [and] must also evaluate the
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M6rida Initiative and coordination by the United States Department of
Justice, since it manages the COPS program in the United States.' 3 '
Furthermore, Mexico has the potential to develop a federal program of
community policing and implement the program throughout the
nation. However, the coordination between the local, state, and
federal police forces is imperative to ensure that a program like the
"Broken Windows Theory" works in Mexico. The United States'
supervisory role, through constant feedback and evaluation, is
essential to ensure that police conduct falls within the training, the
federal police focus on tackling DTO violence, and community
policing does not transform into a negative effect on the community
and Mexico.
The missing component in Mexico is the police interaction and
communication with the community, which would fall under pillar IV
of the M6rida Initiative. At the beginning, it will be extremely
difficult to believe in the changes implemented by the local police
force, but with a local meeting ground between the two, a start at
change can occur. Similar to Chicago's Beat Meetings, the police
force can hold weekly or bi-weekly meetings for the community to
meet with their police representatives and discuss the physical and
social disorder in their community.' 3 2 Furthermore, the police force
needs to gain the trust of the local community leaders such as priests,
teachers, private citizens, and civic leaders, to communicate as
intermediaries to ensure that the police force has the backing of those
highly invested in the community.133 The government may use the
example under the Boston model where two components of police
work are initiated: the first would be solving the immediate problem
of violent crimes within the community, and the second would be
using the leaders within the community in the meetings as

harm done to the victim or effect on the community.").
131. JAMES, supra note 95, at 1 (The COPS program aims to "advance
community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States.") (footnote
omitted).
132. See Forman, Jr., supra note 98, at 9.
133. See id. Chicago uses "District Advisory Committees" and meets with the
District commanders of the police force on a regular basis to discuss the
community's conditions and police responses. Id.
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intermediaries to address police abuse,1 34 in addition to the physical
and social disorder problems within the community.
Once trust is maintained between the community and the police
force; further steps can be taken to solidify this trust. Using the
example from Japan, additional precincts can be built in
neighborhoods and the police's role can evolve even more: from mere
crime scene investigators to community problem solvers.135
Community policing cannot be just a short-term goal, it must be an
investment into the community and a program that will remain intact
regardless of the leaders in power. The success of this program is not
only reducing violence, but also building a strong and resilient
community that relies and trusts in the police and the government.
Community policing would be an essential and positive program
to implement under both pillar II and pillar IV of the M6rida Initiative.
The basic commonality that all countries and cities had when
implementing community policing was the existence of a crisis in
crime rates and disconnect between communities and the police.
Traditional approaches were no longer viable to ensure crime was not
only quelled, but prevented. For example, when the CAPS program
and the concept of community policing in general was considered as a
possible new program in Chicago, the city's crime problem peaked
due to an increase in drug trafficking and gang-related activity.' 3 6 The
four largest gangs in the city accounted for almost seventy percent of
the gang crimes, and with the lucrative business of selling crackcocaine, alliances between gangs fell apart and the city fell victim to
high homicide rates. 137 Furthermore, the Chicago police department
was characterized as "lazy, poorly-managed, and unresponsive to
policy direction." 38
134. See, e.g., id. at 38-39.
135. See SKOLNICK & Bayley, supra note 115.
136. SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 107, at 20-21 (noting that during 1991,
"almost 44,000 robberies were reported ... [a]ssaults were up by 1,000" from the
previous year, burglaries were substantially higher than the previous year, and
murders reached "fourth in the nation.").
137. Id. at 21-22. The housing projects in Chicago became the breeding
ground for most of the gang related violence in the city and the violent crime rate in
the housing projects was twice as much as the rest of the city. Id. at 22.
138. Id. at 26. (explaining that the police during the early 1990s were
documented as being non-responsive to troubled spots or 911 calls, covering up

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/6

30

Acevedo: Stepping Up the Mérida Initiative: Community Policing as a Founda

2014]

STEPPING UP THE MtRIDA INITIATIVE

255

Mexico is currently dealing with a serious crisis that involves
drugs, highly organized drug cartels, and complete community distrust
of the government and the police force. Similarly to Chicago, Mexico
suffers from high homicide rates due mostly to the DTO violence as a
result of the lucrative business of drug trafficking. During former
President Calder6n's six year presidency, over 60,000 individuals
were estimated to have been killed as a result of the perpetual drug
violence and defense mechanisms instilled by the country.1 39
With divisions and adversarial relationships between the
numerous DTOs,140 the homicide rate increase was, and continues to
be, attributed to the DTOs persistence in gaining and controlling
territory to conduct their business effectively. Furthermore, there
seems to be an ever increasing threat of violence with the change in
the presidency.141 In order to decrease the amount of violence that
plagues Mexico, the Mexican government must enlist the community
to assist them in their fight to retain peace in their country, which is
the approach Chicago took when its city dealt with a significant spike
in drug-related violence.
Former President Calder6n took a
progressive step, similarly to Chicago with the CAPS strategy,
towards implementing a community policing archetype with "Todos

Somos Juirez."l 4 2

mistakes made by their colleagues, and providing "indifferent service.")
139. See Hearing, supra note 16, at 3 (statement of Rep. Albio Sires,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs).
140. The Zetas cartel was once a section of the Gulf Cartel, but broke off to
fight a war with the Sinaloa cartel to gain JArez as a main territory. See Kerr, supra
note 14, at 195-96. In other instances, when there was a capture of one leader under
the "kingpin" strategy, the DTOs would break apart and violence would rise due to
their desire to control territory. See Hearing, supra note 16, at 63 (testimony of
Steven Dudley, Director, Insight Crime).
141. The government estimates that "at least 6,000 additional organized crimerelated deaths occurred during the first six months of the Pefia Nieto
Administration." PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 15.
142. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 65 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime). The phrase "Todos Somos Juirez" means "We are all Juirez." Id.
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A. We are all Judrez: The Community Moves to Quell the City's
Violence
In 2011, Ciudad Juirez was synonymous with drug violence in
Mexico. Between 2007 and 2011, the city's homicide rate went from
about 300 to over 3,500 deaths.14 3 The cause of the violence stemmed
from the larger DTOs fighting for control over the city and one of the
most important access points between the United States and Mexico;
corrupt officials were involved by allowing the drug trade to
flourish.144 While there was a dramatic rise in violence, there was
also a dramatic reduction in murders, extortion, and kidnappings in the
city.145 Some analysts believed that the Sinaloa cartel won the war
against the Judrez cartel for control of the territory, but others have a
strong belief that the active involvement of the citizens led to the
quelling of violence in Ciudad Juirez.146
Former President Calder6n responded to this violence by creating
the "Todos Somos Judrez (We Are All Juirez) [project] that brought
together the business community, civil society and the various levels
of government to take on the challenge ... ." of eliminating the
organized crime that plagued the city.147 Under former President
Calder6n, the Mexican government spent a quarter of a billion dollars
to change the infrastructure of the city. 148 As a result of the
investment to the societal issues of the city, Ciudad Juirez created a
platform for officials and the community to discuss the underlying
issues. They implemented the "Mesa de Seguridad," or a safety table,
that is currently managed by the citizens; government officials come

143. Id.at 64.
144. Id at 64-65.
145. Id. at 64.
146. Id.
147. Christopher Wilson, Todos Somos Nuevo Laredo? How Mexico's PRI
Can Make Nuevo Laredo into Juarez, WILSON CENTER (Aug. 7, 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted), http://wilsoncenter.org/article/todos-somos-nuevo-laredohow-mexicos-pri-can-make-nuevo-laredo-juarez.
148. Alfredo Corchado, As Juarez Curbs Cartel and Corruption, Hundreds
Apply to Be Cops, DALLAS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2013, 11:26 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/nationworld/mexico.20130414-as-juarez-curbscartels-and-corruption-hundreds-apply-to-be-cops.ece.
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to the meetings to listen to the problems the city is facing.' 4 9 Within
the "Mesa," there are fourteen committees meeting monthly that are
designed to tackle a specific crime or issue, such as kidnapping, car
theft, or the Emergency Response Center.15 0 The "Mesa" also acts as
an intermediary between the officials and the community because,
although there has been tremendous progress with ensuring problems
get solved, the community in Ciudad Juirez still lacks trust for both
the public officials and the police.' 5 '
Although this is a skeletal implementation of community policing,
the need for positive police-community interaction is the key
component to ensure that this system works and remains a stronghold
for Ciudad Juirez. Furthermore, Ciudad Juirez shows that not only
can community policing work in Mexico, but it can show successful
results. Lastly, even though the community continues to distrust the
police force and the local government, dialogue has been initiated and
continues. This in itself is promising because community is central to
the community policing model, and without communication,
community policing would not be a viable option.' 52 The example of
"Todos Somos Juirez" is an excellent archetype that can positively
transform many cities in Mexico, including the violent city of Nuevo
Laredo.
B. Nuevo Laredo: Strike it While The Leader is Out
The early successes of Ciudad Judrez, with the implementation of
"Todos Somos Juirez," have brought a potential opportunity to
149. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 65 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. For example, in Southtown Chicago, facilitators came in to open dialogue
between the Hispanic members and African-American members within the
community, who at times were in conflict with one another. Forman, Jr., supra note
98, at 43. The facilitators were able to open dialogue, locate a problem in a city park
and divide between the two groups, and create a plan that allowed both groups use
of the park. Id. When the facilitators left, the African-American members moved the
meetings to a central location in their section, the Hispanic members no longer went
to the meetings, and the police force would reject many of the proposals at the Beat
Meetings. Id. at 43-44. As a result, the community meetings deteriorated and
problems within the community persisted. Id. at 44.
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develop similar programs in other border-state cities. One particular
city plagued by the DTO violence is Nuevo Laredo, which is located
in Tamaulipas, Mexico.' 53 The situation in Nuevo Laredo changed a
few years ago when the Gulf DTO and the Zetas DTO split; this split
began a turf war between the two DTOs, which led to a dramatic
increase in violence.154
Nuevo Laredo has many characteristics that make the city very
attractive for a DTO. It is one of the most important crossing points
between Mexico and the United States, totaling between 10,000 to
12,000 cargo trucks crossing the border and about 500 million dollars
in trade each day.' 5 5 The city is also a main crossing point for many
of the eastern states in Mexico, including the Mexican capital, el
Distrito Federal, and Monterrey.156 Furthermore, police corruption
continues to run rampant in the town.15 7 The majority of the victims
do not report their crimes, and most of the population sees the
investigative process as a waste of time. 15 The problem with
corruption is so extreme, that in July 2011, the entire municipal police
force was disbanded because of the corruption, and the military has
taken over police responsibility.159
Additionally, the city is controlled by the Zetas DTO and the
homicide rate has gone up by ninety-two and-a-half percent in the last
year.160 The Zetas pose a significant threat in that their tactics are
more aggressive and invasive when it comes to controlling territory. 16 1
The Zetas control the news outlets by dictating what news may be
broadcasted, and by using extreme acts of violence to perpetuate their

153. See Mexico 2013 Crime & Safety Report, supra note 120.
154. Id.
155. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 67 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
156. Id. at 68.
157. Mexico 2013 Crime and Safety Report, supra note 120.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Wilson, supra note 147.
161. See MICHELE COSCIA & VIRIDIANA RIos, KNOWING WHERE AND How
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATE USING WEB CONTENT § 6.2 (2012), available

at http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ptr/files/cosciarios.pdf

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/6

34

Acevedo: Stepping Up the Mérida Initiative: Community Policing as a Founda

2014]

STEPPING UP THE MWRIDA INITIATIVE

259

dominance in the city.162 In essence, the Zetas organization does not
consider itself a DTO, but more a military group whose purpose is
controlling territory and the people in the territory that conduct the
illegal activity. 6 3 This key characteristic of the Zetas makes them
different than most of the other DTOs and also a formidable challenge
for both Mexico and the United States.' 64
Yet, the leader of the Zetas DTO was captured in July 2013,165
leaving many questions about the vitality of the organization.' 66 This
great blow to the DTO is an important element because if the federal
government is tactful about this development, it can go into Nuevo
Laredo and implement all four pillars of the Mrida Initiative. Under
pillar I, the federal government, with the assistance of the United
States, can use the resources and training to continue dismantling the
organization, and attacking any top leaders, middle management, and
the lower bodies that have been loyal to the organization, which
includes cutting off financial resources.1 67
Furthermore, under pillar II, Nuevo Laredo is without a police
force.168 Recruiting new police officers, possibly from the federal
government or other towns, would be necessary to rebuild the lost
police force. This would require thorough background checks,
polygraph tests, and drug tests, many of which were used during the
Calder6n presidency.' 69 If enough individuals get recruited into the
police force, then with the assistance of the federal police and the

162. William Booth, In Mexico's Nuevo Laredo, Drug Cartels Dictate Media
Coverage, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/01/AR2010080 103481.html. The Zetas have people
working in the news organizations ensuring that stories of their activities do not get
published. Id. The Zetas are also responsible for bombings of news buildings, and
there are frequent kidnappings of journalists. Id. Kidnapping rates in Nuevo Laredo
are also the highest in the nation. Wilson, supra note 147.
163. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 68 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
164. Id.
165. Shoichet, supra note 8.
166. See Corcoran,supra note 12.
167. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 12.
168. See Mexico 2013 Crime and Safety Report, supra note 120.
169. Reid, supra note 14, at 407.
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United States representatives under the M6rida Initiative,17 0 these
individuals can be trained to address the issues pertaining to the
DTOs.
Even more importantly, the police officers can be trained to
implement community policing into their neighborhoods. This would
require extensive understanding of the demographics of the city, the
local problems within the neighborhoods in the city, and the private
citizens that influence the community."' This could mean that police
officers visit churches, speak to teachers at their local schools, and
interact consistently with the local government.172 Establishing forms
of communication is imperative, and the most effective approach is to
gain the trust of the influential individuals in the neighborhoods,
similar to the "Todos Somo Juirez" program.
With enough interactions between the local police and the leaders
of the community, the fourth pillar of the M6rida Initiative will
connect with the first and second. The police can begin a "Mesa de
Seguridad" similar to that of Ciudad Judrez.1 73 Even in Juirez, the
population has yet to trust the government, but they do trust the "Mesa
de Seguridad," and therefore the beginning steps of establishing a
bridge of communication are possible and concrete. 174 This new form
of interaction will take time, energy, frustrations, and a complete
understanding of the community and of community policing. 7' It
requires an open-mind and a change in the way policing is conducted.
But it is possible, and for the sake of Mexico and the United States, it
is an essential component to seeing concrete results under the Mbrida
Initiative and making a difference in the fight against the DTO
violence.
170. See SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 18, at 14.
171. See UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 9.

172. See id. at 28.
173. See Hearing,supra note 16, at 65 (testimony of Steven Dudley, Director,
Insight Crime).
174. Id.
175. See UNDERSTANDING

COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 28

(describing the necessity for community policing to be a "dynamic and flexible
process . . . ." where on-going feedback and evaluation is essential. The planning
must accord to the "needs, conditions, and priorities . . . ." of each individual

community, and criticisms need to be accepted to refine and revise the model during
the implemented stage.)
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An important additional note must be addressed. The local police
force has to show that they are of the people, whether or not the
community distrusts them at the beginning. This would mean that
while the local police force manages the small problems to gain the
trust of the community, the federal police must still address the bigger
picture of tackling the DTOs head-on under pillar I. Both of these
pillars need to be working simultaneously because of the extreme hold
the DTOs have on the town, and the complete lack of trust the people
have for the government. Furthermore, Mexico's problem with
corruption and human rights violations pose large barriers for
community policing. In order to effectively implement the plan, these
problems must be addressed and resolved.
C. Additional Issues that Impede Community Policing'sSuccess
in Mexico
The difficulties that deter community policing in Mexico are
grave, but they can be overcome through persistence, consistency, and
building trust between the communities and the government. Once
the United States commits to funding the Mrida Initiative, as the
House of Representatives will recommend for the 2014 fiscal year,17 6
the focus must shift towards the issues of human rights violations and
distrust for the government. The judicial system reformation must
continue as the first step. Past conduct in reforming the system, with
the guidance of the United States Department of Justice, Department
of State and USAID, have shown hopeful signs of successes
transitioning to an open adversarial system, with states such as
Chihuahua, Morelos, and Zacatecas successfully making the
change. 177

176. PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 15 ("[T]he house version
of the FY2014 State-Foreign Operations appropriations legislation (H.R.
28555/H.Rept. 113-185) recommends fully funding Mrida).
177. See SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO, supra note 45,
at 8, 13. Chihuahua is considered by many to be a model state because it has
successfully reformed the judicial system, adopted the reformed criminal code, and
has implemented these changes throughout the state. Id. at 8. This process took
approximately two and a half years to accomplish, which indicates to signs that
change can be effectively accomplished within the allotted time frame. Id. at 8-9.
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The judicial system reformation is crucial to implementing
community policing. If the communities trust that their participation
will lead to successfully prosecuting criminals, protecting the rights of
the victims, and protecting the innocent, then it would only open the
door to increased member participation in community policing in the
future. Furthermore, accountability for human rights violators within
the federal police force and military must be included within the
judicial reform. Arbitrary detentions and torture techniques used by
the Mexican government can no longer be tolerated or go
unnoticed.' 7 8
The current government practices do not have adequate remedies
for human rights violations,1 7 9 and therefore trust is at a weak point.
But there have been significant changes with addressing human rights
violations in Mexico. The Mexican Supreme Court has opened the
door to bring human rights violations against the military to civilian
court,' which would in turn allow the justice system the ability to
account for these human rights violations, which they had not been
able to do in the past. The decision is monumental and shows that
Mexico is stepping up to address their problem with human rights
violations.
The federal police and military are not the only human rights
violators. State police officers routinely conduct torturing techniques

178. Pre-charged judicial detention routinely occurs without due process and
over 1500 reports of abuse occurred during the year 2012. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2013: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN

RIGHTS, available at http://amnesty.org/en/region/mexico/report-2013 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2014). One example of the human rights abuses occurred where three
brothers, one being fourteen years old, "were picked up by judicial police in Ciudad
Juirez . . . ." and they were beaten, given electric shock treatment, and forced to
confess to an extortion crime. Id. A torture complaint was filed, but no information
was given or action taken against the human rights violators. Id.
179. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23. Out of nearly 5,000
investigations opened for human rights violations, there were only 38 convictions.
Id. "[C]itizens must file for an injunction against trial in military courts on a caseby-case basis.. . ." Laura Carlsen, Mexico's False Dilemma: Human Rights or
Security, 10 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 146, 148 (2012). The overwhelming amount of
complaints and limited option to obtain a conviction has placed Mexico in a
predicament where accountability is virtually non-existent. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra.
180. See generally WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM., supra note 53.
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to attain information from detainees. 1 8 ' The incentive for using
torturing techniques was based on the practice that a confession
sufficed a conviction. 182 But the investigation process has been
extended to include "evidence gathered [and] can be contradicted in
an oral, public trial. ... 183 Prosecutors will be obligated to support
their charges against an individual and show the methods police took
to acquiring the evidence; the defense will also be allowed to rebut the
evidence and show any discrepancies in attaining that evidence. 184
The end result is ensuring that the accused have an opportunity to
defend their innocence, and the police will have to show guilt through
means other than mere confessions.
Further changes are occurring in Mexico. The Mexican Supreme
Court in November 2013 ruled that "evidence obtained through torture
human
rights
is
of fundamental
or other violations
inadmissible . . . ."185 This ruling is a monumental step in the
direction of protecting human rights, and another example of how
Mexico is reforming its police conduct. President Pefia Nieto is also
showing support for accountability by opening dialogue in addressing
human rights violations and supporting a law which would require
states to support crime victims and their families.' 86 It is extremely
important that President Pefia Nieto continues to reform the judicial
system and fund programs aimed at quelling human rights violations
to see these changes unfold throughout the country.

181. Approximately two-thirds of police investigations are conducted with
torturing techniques. Stephanie Erin Brewer, Structural Human Rights Violations:
The True Face of Mexico's War on Crime, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 7, 9 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
182.

See SUPPORTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO, supra note 45,

at 5.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Israel Arzate Mel6ndez was arbitrarily detained and tortured for a
confession in a multiple homicide. Mexico: Key Supreme Court Ruling on Torture
Case,

HUMAN

RIGHTS

WATCH

(Nov.

7,

2013),

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/07/mexico-key-supreme-court-ruling-torturecase. The Mexican Supreme Court has yet to publish its opinion. Id.
186. See PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES, supra note 12, at 17; ICMA MexicoLatinoamerica,supra note 79.
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Another concern that must be addressed is the continual
corruption within the local and state police. Under community
policing, the police officers will be responsible for holding town
meetings, problem-solving small issues within the community, and
gaining the community's trust. 8 7 The police officer will also have
discretionary powers when problem solving these issues. But if a
police officer turns into a collaborative third-party to the DTOs, both
the training and the trust are lost. The DTOs profit margins range in
the billions, and therefore they have the means to bribe state
officials.' 8 8
DTO bribes are lucrative, while a police officer's monthly pay
fails to attract loyalty in comparison. 189 Therefore, it is imperative
that Mexico address the lack of education, low wages, and turnover
rates in the police force. 190 Mexico must ensure that the hired police
force can withstand these temptations through effective training and
accountability measures that successfully prosecute the individuals
who are bought by the DTOs. The Mexican federal and state
governments must also create a viable standard of living that police
officers can maintain and protect. Former President Calder6n initiated
a screening process that extended to all 375,000 municipal and state
officers to eliminate corrupt individuals.' 9 ' This preliminary solution
is only the beginning. Routine inspections by third-party independent
groups and by the federal government are imperative.1 92
187. See UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at 16-17.
188. Kerr, supra note 14, at 196.
189. Mexican authorities have stated that DTOs pay around $100 million a
month to bribe municipal police officers throughout the country. Mexico: Cartels
Pay Corrupt Cops $100 million a Month, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB.
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?Categoryld=14091&Articleld=362206 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014). On average the state police officer in Tamaulipas, Mexico makes
around 250 dollars a month, and the average federal police officer makes around 700
dollars a month. Patrick Corcoran, Pay Rises Alone Won't Break Chain of Police
Corruption, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.insightcrime.org/newsanalysis/pay-rises-alone-wont-break-chain-of-police-corruption.
190. Reid, supra note 14, at 403.
191. This includes polygraph tests, background checks, and drug testing. Id. at
407. It also includes maintaining database for corrupt officers in order to prevent
future hiring of the same individuals in other precincts or states. Id.
192. See generally UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 92, at
35-36 (describing the need for supervision as a key to effective community policing
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Accountability is key with community policing, so if Mexico does not
prosecute the corrupt individuals, all of the training and initial
screenings will mean nothing.193
Mexico remains a troubled nation consumed with DTO violence,
corruption, and human rights violations. But with an insurmountable
crisis, there is an opening for a radical change that has proven to be
effective in other parts of the world affected with similar problems.
Mexico's task involves changing their perspective to ensure that this
grave problem is resolved and the solution remains a success for many
decades to come. Through the justice reform, training of their state
and federal police force, and added accountability measures, Mexico
has begun the steps at rehabilitating the country. The missing
component is the inclusion of community policing as a way to
combine all of the Mrida Initiative's measures and include the
community in the rehabilitation process. This program is an effective
way to combine all necessary components to make Mexico a safe
country, but it will only work if the individuals involved work
together and choose to protect the country and its communities.
V. CONCLUSION

President Nieto's strategy in focusing the M6rida Initiative on the
state and local governments' reformation, and reducing violent crimes,
is necessary to the progress the United States and Mexico make with
eliminating the DTOs and their perpetual violence. Although violence
has not been eliminated, it has calmed down enough to shift the focus
to reforming the justice system and the police force, and building a
strong community unafraid of the DTOs' acts of violence. It is a
starting point where Mexico can incorporate-' the community to
collaborate with Mexican officials, both with the local and state
government and its police forces; this can be accomplished through
community policing.
Community policing can assist in solving the immediate problems
of the DTOs and the underlying issues that allow their continual
strength in the most vulnerable cities. Through the initial success of

and how middle managers are another source for patrol officers to respond to a
wider set of demands).
193. See Reid, supra note 14, at 406.
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Ciudad Juirez, Mexico proves that community policing is a viable
option to build trust between the government and its people. By
incorporating a more systematic approach of community policing,
Mexico will reinvent relationships between the police forces and the
communities in Mexico, which has the potential to assist in sustaining
a strong rule of law. Furthermore, with the United States and its
assistance under the M6rida Initiative, Mexico will have the essential
resources to continue their fight against the DTO violence and create
strong and resilient communities through the rule of law by
implementing community policing.
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